Karl Jaspers published the fi rst edition of 'General Psychopathology' in 1913. Now, coinciding with its 100 th anniversary whose importance was consecrated through multiple congresses, we see a parallelism and a return to the dilemma of the 'Methodenstreit', which led Karl Jaspers to introduce the phenomenological method for psychopathology to understand the subjective manifestations of the mind. Phenomenology is part of the research and clinical methods in psychiatry and psychology as a way to capture the subjective in psychopathology. However, phenomenology is nowadays wrongly used. In this article, we attempt to rediscover and present in a clear way the origins and meaning of Jaspers' phenomenology, whose bases, although forgotten, remain current. This will be done by revising its fundamental concepts such as objective and subjective manifestations, understanding and its four types, causal explanation, empathy, intuition, presuppositions and preconceptions, phenomenological description and comprehensive 'seeing' .
INTRODUCTION
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) was a German philosopher, psychiatrist, and the father of the phenomenological method for psychopathology. His journey in psychiatry started in the late nineteenth century when there was a major debate regarding the position of psychology, psychiatry, and human sciences in relation to the scientifi c method ('Methodenstreit'). With the great uprising of neuroscientists at that time, there was a general tendency to include psychology and psychiatry with the exact sciences since their research methods should be similar. 1, 2 In reaction to this positivistic approach arose another line of thought which held that the ontology (object) and epistemology (method) of human sciences differed from those of exact sciences. The sociologist Max Weber was one of the authors defending this view, and according to him, sociology needed a hybrid approach between those for human science and natural sciences. Jaspers followed this view and applied it to psychiatry. 3 According to him, it was necessary to 'link psychiatric reality with the traditional humanities'. 4 He contradicted contemporary German psychiatry dominated by thoughts of neuroscientists such as Nissl, Alzheimer, and Wernicke. 5 As a tool to support his view, Jaspers introduced the phenomenological method. This method is a way of understanding the subjective manifestations of the mind, which should be the starting point for the development of any theory of psychopathology. In the current times, with a new phase of refl ection on the methods and criteria in psychopathology coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the fi rst edition of 'General Psychopathology' (1913), Jaspers' work is often revisited. However, the term 'phenomenology' is now being used loosely and often without any connection to its original meaning. In this article, we attempt to rediscover the origins and meaning of Jaspers' phenomenology.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MANIFESTATIONS
For Jaspers, it was important to fi rst classify psy-Folia Medica I 2018 I Vol. 60 I No. 3 chopathological manifestations into objective and subjective. This distinction may be based on his medical training, which classically distinguished signs from symptoms. However, according to Jaspers, objective and subjective phenomena differ slightly from this distinction:
Objective manifestations mainly include signs and symptoms that can be observed directly and measured quantitatively. However, he also included symptoms accessed through rational thought and not by empathy, which he defi ned as rational content of what a patient reports, in objective manifestations. Examples of such symptoms are "delusions… in so far as this can be understood in a purely intellectual way (…) without empathy". 4 Subjective manifestations are accessed by means of empathy and include all emotions and inner processes (such as fear and joy) that can be observed directly through manifestations of the patient but also those only accessed second-hand through the patient's judgments and considerations. In addition, subjective symptoms include the mental processes inferred from records of the patient's manifestations and the way they lead their life. 6 Thus, subjective symptoms may be divided into three groups depending on how they are accessed: a) experiences that psychopathologists can access directly through the patient's appearance and body language; b) experiences the patient reports and are only accessed by the psychiatrist through verbal communication; c) experiences the psychopathologist can only access by interpreting a set of manifestations (body expressions, patient reports, etc.). 7 (Table 1) ordered (thoughts, perceptions, etc.). On the other hand, through genetic understanding, connections are established between various mental states (e.g., mood swing scan be associated with certain life experiences).
Both static and genetic understanding can be either of the rational or empathic type. Rational understanding involves capturing objective manifestations through rationality or establishing logical connections between mental states without empathy. On the other hand, empathic understanding involves accessing truly subjective phenomena using empathy and establishing connections between subjective phenomena (e.g., the appearance of certain delusional thoughts secondary to mood states).
Several times throughout Jaspers' research, phenomenology was distinguished from comprehensive psychology:
"The representation, defi nition, description, and ordering of psychic states is the task of phenomenology; on the other hand, the understanding with conviction of psychic connections is the concern of the psychology of meaning (comprehensive psychology)". 8 Subsequently, Jaspers resorted to the term comprehensive psychopathology to describe the application of psychology to understanding psychopathology (mental states considered pathological). According to Jaspers, with comprehensive psychopathology "we try to extend our understanding to unusual and remote connections which at fi rst sight perhaps seem incomprehensible". 4 Jaspers emphasized, "phenomenology itself has nothing to do with this genetic understanding and must be treated as something entirely separate… we restrict phenomenology to whatever can be 
UNDERSTANDING (STATIC VS. GENETIC AND RATIONAL

VS. EMPATHIC)
Jaspers distinguished four types of understanding: static versus genetic and rational versus empathic. Through static understanding, mental states are represented, defi ned, described in detail, and understood statically". 6 An order for the two was also implied. First we describe in detail the psychic states, then we can go further and understand the psychic connections between the various states. 9 Basically, phenomenology involves static and empathic understanding, whereas comprehensive psychopathology involves genetic and empathic understanding.
Jaspers emphasized that psychological understanding or empathy is intuitive, and the connections established through it are evident and not obtained by a rational inductive method. Understanding is "clear and we understand directly how one psychic event emerges from another" 4 , and thus similar to his empathy defi nition. (Table 2) tuition, evidence, and truth coincide.
On the other hand, although Jaspers also mentioned the term intuition as essential to phenomenology, he defi ned it as access to a mental process with all its details, for which direct experience of the process was not necessary. Often, Jaspers used this term in conjunction with another: 'vergegenwartigen', which meant perceiving something in our Table 2 . Static/genetic understanding and rational/empathic understanding
Understanding Use
Static To represent, defi ne, describe, and order mental states.
Genetic
To establish connections between various mental states.
Rational
To access objective symptoms through rationality.
Empathic
To access subjective phenomena through empathy.
EMPATHY
Subjective manifestations can be accessed through empathic understanding. For Dilthey, understanding ('Verstehen') requires empathy ('Einfühlen') and co-experiencing ('Mitfühlen'). Jaspers borrowed these terms in his phenomenology. 10 According to Jaspers, subjective symptoms are not accessed through senses, but by a "transferring oneself, so to say, into the other individual's psyche" ('Sichhineinversetzen') and "share the patient's experiences" ('Mitfühlen'), but without any intellectual effort. This process constitutes empathy. 6 Jaspers used many metaphors to describe empathy; thus through empathy, a phenomenologist can co-experience patients' experiences using his imagination and by transposition into others' mind, patients' actual experiences.
INTUITION
In German, the term 'anschauen' can be translated in several ways, although the most accurate is intuition. The current meaning of intuition corresponds to the ability to understand, identify, or assume things that do not depend on empirical knowledge or rational concepts. However, this meaning was not the one used by Husserl and Jaspers in their work. 11 Husserl used the term intuition in the sense of directly experiencing something. He argued that one could directly access mental processes of another through the phenomenological method (observing them directly). 12 According to him, intuition is used when the object is presented (through perception), which makes it present 'in person'. For him, inmind as if it had been directly experienced, albeit it was not. To access a patient's experiences without experiencing them directly, a phenomenologist likely needs to use resources such as imagination.
Therefore, we can understand what Jaspers meant by: "Phenomenology has the task of making mental states of the patient become intuitively present ('anschaulichzuvergenwartigen') in us". 7 He added, "as we never perceive the mental life of another person directly, we have to try to make it present". 6 Thus, by combining Dilthey's concepts of understanding and empathy and Husserl's concept of intuition, Jaspers formulated his methodology, which requires a phenomenologist to transpose into the patient's mind, co-experience their condition using imagination, and thus render them intuitively present. These experiences can then be described and organized as psychopathological concepts.
Understanding often provides aspects not accessible to consciousness (that go unnoticed to consciousness), but Jaspers resisted calling it as unconscious (wanting to remain distant from psychoanalysis), stating that it was not clear where the boundaries of consciousness start. 6 Jaspers was also very critical of psychoanalysis when he said "Freud is actually concerned with the psychology of meaningful connections and not with causal explanation as he himself believed". 4 He believed that understanding has limits and cannot determine causal explanations for the entire psychic life, as intended by Freud's theory. Moreover, Freud's theory makes comprehensive connections between elaborate general and universal theories, which was unthinkable for Jaspers since according to him, understanding only focuses on individual psychic phenomena. He was also very critical of Freud's comprehensive connections, which he considered unconvincing and simplistic, since these reduced all psychic life to a set of factors related to sexuality. 6 
CAUSAL EXPLANATION
The initial distinction between understanding and explanation was borrowed from Dilthey who said "we explain nature, understand the psychic life", and on the other hand, "on the basis of this empathy or transportation there arises the highest form of understanding in which the totality of mental life is active" 10 . Although it is very likely Jaspers took this notion from Dilthey, the Cartesian (mind vs. body) radicalism that Dilthey used to separate human and natural sciences was removed by Jaspers: "The suggestive assumption that the psychic is the area of meaningful understanding and the physical that of causal explanation is wrong. There is no real event, be it of physical or of psychic nature which is not in principle accessible to causal explanation…". 8 Jaspers thought that while "explanation has no limits, for understanding there are limits everywhere". 4 According to him, although some authors believe all psychic phenomena are understandable paying heed to the meaningfully connections between them" 8 , and 2) the inability of these different processes to overlap: "In no case do understanding and explanation, which have such diverse origins, converge in one aspect of psychic life". 4 A
For causal explanation, connections are formed using rational thinking based on established scientifi c theories. Nonetheless, Jaspers noted that elements obtained through understanding, are the starting point for possible causal explanations. According to him, phenomenology can provide the elements for causal research. 8 For example, "a phenomenological element, such as hallucination, can come to be explained by an organic process". 8 (Table 3)   Table 3 . Psychopathological phenomena accessible through understanding
Types of phenomena Examples Access
Phenomena accessible through understanding Secondary delusion Understanding
Phenomena not accessible through understanding Primary delusion Causal explanation (probably talking about Freud here), only some aspects of the psyche are accessible to understanding. According to Jaspers, causal explanation begins where understanding ends. This can be explained by the fact that understanding and causal explanation are completely distinct paths or because explanation is an extension of understanding when it encounters to its limits. This renders two ideas between which Jaspers shuttled throughout his work: 1) the reducibility of understanding to causal explanation by principle -understandability can be reduced to the cause: "It is not absurd to think that it might one day be possible to have some rules which could causally explain the sequence of meaningfully connected thought processes without 1.6 PRESUPPOSITIONS Jaspers was very confi dent that understanding should be stripped of presuppositions and preconceptions. 8 One of the fi rst issues raised in 'General Psychopathology' was the need for psychopathologic methods to be immune to presuppositions. Thus, any kind of philosophical, religious, theoretical, biological, or diagnostic presuppositions should be avoided. With regard to diagnostic preconceptions, Jaspers affi rmed "in the psychiatric assessment of a case, diagnosis is left to the last but in practice, except in the case of well-known cerebral changes, diagnosis is the least relevant factor". 4 According to him, diagnosis is the less essential in psychopathological work, and if converted into principal, it can become an anticipation of something that should ideally remain at the end of the investigation. It is essential that "… The chaos of phenomena should not be blotted out with some diagnostic label but bring illumination through the way it is systematically ordered and related". 4 According to Jaspers, we must turn away from all the theories we had access to, psychological constructs (probably referring to psychological theories such as psychoanalysis), or materialized mythologies of brain processes (several times he calls biological theories advocated at the time 'mythologies'). We must limit ourselves to learn what we can understand, intuit, and describe their true existence. 7 On the other hand, Jaspers distinguished presuppositions and preconceptions as unshakable absolute basic presuppositions that the psychopathologist and all researchers must possess. Yet they are just "tentative ideas which we then take as experimental hypotheses; they are certain basic attitudes in ourselves, derivations of our own being" 4 that enable a structured understanding. That is, contrary to what many critics refer, stating that Jaspers demanded a total absence of presuppositions, which were inconsistent with the psychopathological organization and classifi cation he advocated; this is not correct, because he already provided this situation.
According to Jaspers, this lack of presuppositions is not achieved through a passive attitude by the phenomenologist, but rather is a result of careful effort.
The need for an absence of presuppositions may have been infl uenced by Husserl. He believed that the methods in phenomenology should be stripped of any assumption, and thus anything not accessed exclusively through phenomenology should not be valued. However, the absence of presuppositions required by Jaspers is not absolute, contrary to what is demanded of the phenomenological search of the phenomena's essence.
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
In his 1957 'Philosophical Autobiography,' Jaspers stated: "… As a method I adopted Husserl's phenomenology, which, in its beginning, he called descriptive psychology; I retained it although I rejected its further development to insight into essences". 13 The way Jaspers used the descriptive term seems to have been borrowed from Husserl. Both refer to descriptions of phenomena that can be directly obtained through intuition (and nothing else). The description is thus a verbal formulation of what is intuited.
On the other hand, the concepts described can be organized and help others psychiatrists to intuitively capture the same psychopathological processes.
" 
THE SEEING OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA
A term often used by Jaspers was to see ('sehen') psychic phenomena. According to him "… This seeing is not done through the senses, but through the understanding" 6 , it is not a sensory seeing, but a comprehensive point of view. To be able to see the phenomena, we have to understand, intuit, and render them present. Seeing is closely associated with understanding, knowing and making present, which are characteristic of the phenomenological method. This term also appears to have been taken from Husserl, who used it in the same way for intuitive and direct grasping of the processes of awareness.
JASPERS' PHENOMENOLOGY
As per Jaspers, phenomenology aims to intuitively access the subjective psychic states of patients' experience, to limit them, to distinguish them as strictly as possible, and defi ne them with precise terms. 4 Jaspers emphasized the importance of the transformation of understanding into something communicable ('mitteilbar'), being open to discussion ('diskutierbar'), and empirical verifi cation ('nachprüfbar'). 7 This is the only possible way to formulate concepts and terms that translate the results of understanding, which is the ultimate goal of phenomenology.
He stated that the great objective of phenomenology is to "delimit the psychic phenomena" and classifi cation in a set of basic symptoms. This includes "breaking down of complex structures into constituents". 6 Systematic organization into categories follows phenomena delimitation. They are grouped according to the 'phenomenological affi nities' of the current state of phenomenology, allowing for future updates of this method. From this point of view, Jaspers phenomenology can be seen as psychopathological taxonomy.
This idea, that more complex structures may result from combinations of simpler phenomena, can give an idea of a genetic understanding. However, the aim of phenomenology is not to reduce the psychic phenomena to a minimum set of symptoms, but to defi ne symptoms for greater precision. 6 According to Jaspers, phenomenology should be devoid of any theoretical contamination. He emphasized that we must not violate the phenomenological system with a basic theory, but simply try to separate the paths of research and expose the multiplicity of psychopathology. 4 Some authors criticize Jaspers on this point, stating that separating psychopathology based on a previous taxonomic system can be considered a theoretical contamination. However, although we understand that this view may be extreme, any method needs a methodological and organizational basis to become feasible and intelligible. As we saw earlier, Jaspers himself accepted the presence of presuppositions as a basis for research.
As mentioned, the main objective of phenomenology is to access psychic phenomena so they can be described and classifi ed. According to Jaspers, it is essential to organize and defi ne phenomena so psychopathologists can integrate the information captured through the phenomenological method intelligibly and peer-to-peer communicable. Therefore, he organizes the 'manifestations of ill psychic life' in clusters of concepts that include most of the signs and symptoms still encountered today during psychopathological examination.
He clearly classifi ed psychopathological phenomena into groups. According to him, the best organization was based on the most profound differences between phenomena. He suggested the following groups: awareness of objects, experience of space and time, awareness of the body, awareness of reality, feelings and affective states, urge, drive and will, awareness of the self, and phenomena of self-refl ection. Many of these original groups are still used, while others have been eliminated. Jaspers believed that it was essential to understand that phenomenology is not concerned with the genesis of the psychic phenomenon, but the method to attain and capture it. Like BarahonaFernandes said, Jasper's phenomenology is an empirical method that focuses on subjective data. 9 Jaspers mentioned that phenomenological analysis can include three types of approaches: 1) observation of behavior, expressive movements, and patient gestures; 2) direct questioning of patients allowing expression of patient experiences under our direction; and 3) written self-descriptions. Jaspers drew attention to the importance of patient self-descriptions being fundamental in the phenomenological analysis. However, the organizers' participation is critical to organize and delimit the material obtained in universal concepts. 4, 6 In phenomenological research, three types of elements can arise: 1) phenomena that are familiar due to our particular experience. They arise from psychic processes very similar to those for normal situations; 2) phenomena that can be understood, such as exaggerations, reductions, or phenomena combinations that we ourselves have already experienced; 3) phenomena completely inaccessible through empathic understanding. We can only approach these through metaphors or analogies. An example would be the ideas that patients experience with irreducible conviction that we will never attain. We can defi ne these only by their own designations and organize them based on serial observations. 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Jaspers' innovative phenomenological method results from the intersection of theoretical constructs from areas as diverse as philosophy (Husserl) , sociology (Dilthey and Weber) and psychiatry, which were adjusted to the psychopathologist's needs. 14,15. There are fi ve basic concepts that allow us to understand Jaspers' phenomenology: 1) The classifi cation of psychopathological manifestations as objective (directly observed, accessed through rational thought) and subjective (emotions and internal processes accessed through empathy).
2) The four types of understanding: a) Static: to represent, defi ne, describe and order different mental states; b) Genetic: to establish connections between the various mental states; c) Rational: to access objective symptoms by rationality or to establish logical connections between mental states; d) Empathic: to access the truly subjective phenomena and establish connections between subjective phenomena. 3) Empathy which is a way to access subjective manifestations not accessed through the senses, by transferring oneself into the other individual's psyche and through participation in their experiences but without any intellectual effort.
4)
Causal explanation, which forms connections by using rational thinking based on established scientifi c theories, begins where understanding ends. Nonetheless, elements obtained through phenomenology are the starting point for possible causal explanations. 5) Any kind of presuppositions and preconceptions should be avoided, and diagnosis should be left to the last.
Phenomenology is not concerned with the genesis of psychic phenomenon, but is actually a method to see and capture them. It transits between an objective psychopathology that doesn't provide information on mental functioning and its interrelations; and a subjective psychopathology that aims to understand mental events as they are experienced. It is the link between psychological phenomena and external elements that allow the examination of the non-observable phenomena.
More than a century after the publication of 'General Psychopathology', Jaspers' phenomenology, a non-artifi cial and faithful description of experience, is still a question of debate as it represents a possible solution to the fl aws of modern diagnostic classifi cations.
In the last years several authors have revisited the concept of phenomenology. Parnas and Sass, call this line of thought "continental phenomenology", and distinguish it from the phenomenology of Jaspers. This is because 'continental phenomenology' departs from the rigorous method of evaluating and operationalizing the anomalous subjective experience (characteristic of Jaspers' phenomenology), and corresponds mainly to a type of approaches that aspire to grasp the essential structures of human experience and existence based mainly on the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Merlau-Ponty, Sartre, Scheler, among others. This approach emphasizes the embodied and embedded nature of human subjectivity. 16 Fuchs 17 , Parnas 18 , Sass 19 , and Stanghelinni 20 are some of the authors that can be considered part of this movement. The structured interviews EASE (Examination of Anomalous Self Experience) 21 and EAWE (Examination of Anomalous World Experience) 22 are some recent projects based on this kind of phenomenology. We defend that it is essential to distinguish this line of thought from Jaspers' phenomenology. The latter was represented fundamentally by the clinical-descriptive psychopathology of Kurt Schneider, Gruhle, Lopez-Ibor, among others, whose main objective is to capture the symptoms of the mental patient without losing itself in metaphysical issues. 9, 23 It is essential that Jaspers' phenomenology is revisited so that its premises can be integrated in the search for a new epistemology for psychiatry.
